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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A LOOK BACK 
AND A LOOK AHEAD 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld * 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. By Barry E. Carter. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 1988. Pp. xiv, 290. $39.90. 
Economic sanctions have always received bad press. They do not 
work, it is said, citing, first of all, the League of Nations' half-hearted 
effort to restrain Mussolini from invading Ethiopia shortly before 
World War II, and also the United States' failure to bring down Cas-
tro's Cuba and the survival for nearly fifteen years of white Rhodesia 
led by Ian Smith. Sanctions encourage bureaucracy, it is said, which is 
certainly true, and invite cheating, which is also true but could be said 
about almost any program of government intervention, beginning with 
taxation. Further, critics assert that economic sanctions merely divert 
markets without causing the target real deprivation, so that, for in-
stance, the Soviet Union buys bulldozers and pipelayers from Japan 
instead of Peoria and wheat from Argentina instead of Kansas. Still, 
economic sanctions, or trade controls for political ends, as I have 
called them, 1 go on, a favorite tool of many countries and organiza-
tions. As in so many ways, the United States is like other countries, 
only more so. Why? 
I think there are two reasons which sometimes blend into each 
other. There is certainly some fear, intensified by the continuing rush 
of technology that politicians Qike lawyers) only dimly understand, 
that some weapon or, more likely, some technical advance such as a 
laser or an explosive or a computer-guidance system will be used 
against us, even as the steel from the Ninth Avenue El in New York 
City was said to have come back in Japanese bombs dropped at Pearl 
Harbor. Second, sanctions send a message of disapproval - less grave 
than the use of force but more serious than just a communique fol-
lowed by business as usual. Many people laughed when President 
Carter forbade export of soccer balls and Coca Cola to the Soviet 
Union for the 1980 Olympics, and grumbled when he pulled the 
American teams out of the competition. I think President Carter was 
right to say "We don't play games with brutal aggressors"; as for the 
practical effect, we will never know. Were American sanctions a flop 
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because Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan almost ten years 
longer? Or did the American response help restrain Soviet activity in 
other parts of Central Asia, for instance Iran? When the United States 
imposed sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union at Christmas-
time in 1981, martial law in Poland was not revoked. But Soviet tanks 
did not move in as they had in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in earlier 
years; eight years later, President Ronald Reagan's statement that 
"we're not letting them get away with it"2 looks less foolish than it did 
at the time. 
If one understands that economic sanctions take time to have ef-
fect, and that the effect is rarely crystal clear, the success rate of eco-
nomic sanctions is rather impressive. Would Nelson Mandela have 
been freed and the African National Congress legalized without 
worldwide sanctions against South Africa? Did the electoral defeat of 
Daniel Ortega have nothing to do with denial of a U.S. market to Nic-
aragua? Is the recent increased exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union 
unrelated to the desire of Soviet leaders to make a new trade agree-
ment with the United States? As these lines were written, the fate of 
Lithuania's drive for independence hung in the balance; was not the 
prospect that credits, joint ventures, and membership in international 
organizations such as GATT and IMF might be withheld a major fac-
tor in the calculations of President Gorbachev? 
All of these thoughts are by way of introduction to the recent vol-
ume on the legal aspects of international economic sanctions, Ameri-
can style, by Professor Barry E. Carter of the Georgetown University 
Law Center. Professor Carter is not an opponent of sanctions. He 
points out that one of the well-known steps leading to the American 
Revolution was the colonists' boycott of English goods in response to 
the Stamp Act of 1765, and another was the American response to the 
Townshend Act that ended eventually in the Boston Tea Party (p. 8). 
He reminded me that I had never quite understood the sequence of 
events that led the United States to participate on the wrong side of 
the Napoleonic wars, but that, whatever the underlying causes, the 
immediate causes of the War of 1812 were clearly embargo and 
counter.:.embargo. 3 And Carter reproduces some facts and figures that 
indicate a higher success rate for sanctions imposed by the United 
States than one might have supposed (pp. 13-31). In any case, he 
writes, "Economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes are here to 
stay. Indeed, for various reasons - many good - the use of these 
2. President's News Conference, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1379, 1381(Dec.17, 1981). 
3. It would be an unnecessary digression for this review to document all the above. But it is 
interesting to note that President Madison's message of June 1, 1812, calling upon Congress to 
declare war against Great Britain, closes with the observation that France has likewise "violated 
the neutral rights of the United States," and declares that "I abstain at this time from recom-
mending to the consideration of Congress definitive measures with respect to that nation .... " 2 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 484, 490 (J. Richardson ed. 1897). 
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sanctions has increased, and no slackening is in sight" (p. 270). "Now 
is the time," he concludes, "to bring order and wisdom to the underly-
ing U.S. laws."4 
That the legal bases for economic sanctions imposed by the United 
States reflect a "haphazard legal regime," to quote from the book's 
subtitle, is clearly true. A mixture of historical accident, ambivalence, 
and deliberate obscurity has left the President - every President since 
Franklin Roosevelt - with almost (but not quite) unlimited discretion 
to control exports, a variety of stated reasons to deny or terminate 
specific benefits such as foreign assistance or preferential tariff treat-
ment, plus expansive powers that, upon declaration of a national emer-
gency, can be brought to bear on almost any activity carried out by 
American business or on American territory. Absent such a declara-
tion, which is supposed to be based on an "unusual and extraordinary 
threat ... to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 
United States,"5 the President has virtually no power to impose re-
straints on imports for political purposes, though of course he does 
have a good many such powers of retaliation for economic injury to 
the United States. 6 
Professor Carter thinks this situation is wrong on two major 
counts: In terms of democratic theory, Presidents have too much 
power to control exports, and the efforts of Congress to be part of the 
process have usually failed. In terms of rational policy, the lopsided 
shape of the President's authority has often led to resort to unsuitable 
but readily available measures, when a more effective measure should 
have been available. Both of these points bear exploration. 
I. CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: THE EXPORT 
CONTROL PROGRAM 
When the Export Control Act was enacted in 1949, it was only a 
few pages long, and contained not much more than a general delega-
tion to the President to prohibit or curtail exports from the United 
4. P. 271. Professor Carter does not discuss international law, and neither will this review. 
It is of interest, however, to recall that when the San Francisco Conference that drafted the 
United Nations Charter was considering the prohibition on the use of force that became article 
2(4) of the Charter, it rejected by a 26-2 vote an amendment proposed by Brazil that would have 
added to the prohibition on the threat or use of force the words "and from the threat or use of 
economic measures .... " Doc. 215, 1/1/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 559 (1945). See Doc. 784, I/1/ 
27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 334-35 (1945) (Summary Report of committee meeting at which the 
Brazilian amendment was discussed). 
5. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, § 202(a), 50 U.S.C. § 170l(a) (1982). 
6. See, for example, § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended to include "super 301," 19 
U.S.C. § 2411 (1988); see also the various responses to dumping and subsidy practices regarded 
as unfair, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677k (1988), as well as§ 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, 
19 u.s.c. § 1337 (1988). 
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States,7 and provision for fine or imprisonment of violators. 8 
On the basis of that brief statute, the U.S. Department of Com-
merce created an elaborate program of general and validated (i.e., ad 
hoc) licenses, country groups, terms such as "unpublished technical 
data," and an enforcement system that operated almost entirely 
outside of judicial control. The Department also invented the concept 
of "export privileges," which by its own self-fulfilling definition meant 
that the business of exporting from the United States - or indeed 
participating anywhere in the chain of an export transaction - was 
not a right, but rather an opportunity that could be suspended, modi-
fied, restricted, or denied, for a period of a few months or for as long 
as the duration of controls. 9 
The legislation was probably right for the period when it was en-
acted: Congress was justifiably concerned about the Berlin blockade, 
the series of coups d'etat in central and eastern Europe, and a powerful 
but technically backward Soviet Union led by Stalin. The United 
States at the time had a massive lead over the rest of the world not 
only in technology, but in wealth generally. Moreover, earlier distrust 
of excessive delegation had been stilled by the success of the war effort, 
and doubts about an imperial presidency had not yet begun to arise. 
By the late 1960s many of these conditions - though not all -
had begun to change. Stalin was long dead, the United States' techno-
logical edge had begun to shrink, the balance of payments had become 
a concern, and American business was beginning to feel that it was 
losing customers to suppliers in Western Europe and Japan who could 
often supply substantially equivalent products with less delay and 
greater security. Moreover, the perception grew - not uniformly, but 
in numerous places in and out of government - that by engaging the 
Soviet Union and its satellites (as they then were in greater or lesser 
degree) in trade, the chances for peace (usually called "lessening of 
tensions") could be improved. Congress, which had never adopted the 
Export Control Act as permanent legislation, 10 tried to change the sys-
tem, or at least the underlying assumptions. 
After a bitter battle in the first year of the Nixon administration, 
which did not end until the final day of the session, Congress passed a 
7. Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-
2032 (1964)) (repealed 1969). Section 3(b) authorized redelegation "to such departments, agen-
cies, or officials of the Government as [the President] may deem appropriate," and on this basis 
the Office of Export Control (by various names) was established in the Department of Com-
merce. In fact no formal delegation was published until the administration of President Ken-
nedy. See Exec. Order No. 10,945, 3 C.F.R. 473 (1959-63). 
8. Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, § 5, 63 Stat. 8 (1949) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2025 (1964)) (repealed 1969). 
9. For examples of how this worked, see A. LoWENFELD, supra note l, at 29-69. 
10. The Act was extended in 1951, 1953, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962, and 1965. 
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new statute, renamed the Export Administration Act11 to point up the 
interest in promoting as well as restraining U.S. exports. Legislative 
criteria were added for the grant or denial of licenses, detailed reports 
were required to be sent to Congress, 12 exporters were to be told why 
their requests were denied, 13 and there were to be consultations within 
the government and with industry about licensing policy, in particular 
about which products were available elsewhere so that restraint by the 
United States would not make much sense. 14 But in 1969 - as at 
nearly all other times - Congress left the executive branch a way out. 
For instance, the issue of foreign availability was addressed in the find-
ings, declaration of policy, and provisions for consultation, but not in 
the operative portions of the Act; if, however, the President deter-
mined "that considerations of national security override considera-
tions of foreign availability," he could control exports of products or 
technical data even if they were available elsewhere, provided only 
that he report his reasons (in quite general terms) to Congress in the 
next quarterly report. ts 
My impression, confirmed by reading Professor Carter's book, is 
that while the list of controlled products gradually shrank and the per-
ception that the Commerce Department was in the forefront of the 
battle against communism gradually faded, the changes in the system 
of export controls were not great. To be sure, some of the earlier quar-
rels over licensing exports of tires (or factories to make tires) that 
might fit on cropdusters but also on warplanes, of V-8 engine blocks 
that were made for Ford sedans but might drive a tank, or of 8-row 
beet harvesters that might increase the Soviet Union's sugar produc-
tion, receded into history. But they were replaced by interagency bat-
tles over whether computers sold to Intourist for use in its hotel and 
railroad reservations system might be used to set targets for interconti-
nental ballistic missiles, and whether at a given moment, Rumania was 
more like Hungary or like Poland for purposes of the Department's 
country groups. In a general way Congress knew about these disputes, 
and from time to time it changed the relative influence of the different 
agencies involved in the decision-making process, sometimes granting 
11. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (expired 
1979) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976)) [hereinafter Export Administration Act 
of 1969]. An earlier version, sponsored by Senators Muskie, Mondale, Packwood and Williams, 
was called the "Export Expansion and Regulation Act of 1969." S. 1940, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1969). 
12. Export Administration Act of 1969, supra note 11, §§ 5(b), 10 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 2404(b), 2409 (1976)). 
13. Export Administration Act of 1969, supra note 11, § 9 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 8 
(1976)). 
14. Export Administration Act of 1969, supra note 11, § 5(a) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 4(a) (1976)). 
15. Export Administration Act of 1969, supra note 11, § 4(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 3(b) (1976)). 
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greater, sometimes lesser, authority to the Defense Department. But 
as the legislation grew longer and the requirements for reports, find-
ings, and determinations multiplied, the essential pattern remained. 
The President could do with exports essentially whatever he wanted, 
so long as the magic words "national security" were pronounced often 
enough. 
After several minor changes in the law in 1972,16 1974,17 and 
1977,18 Congress undertook what it thought was a major overhaul of 
export control legislation in 1979.19 The major items of discretion -
i.e., what products to license and which to restrain, and what countries 
belonged in which country groups - were not touched. But Congress 
divided export controls in two: those adopted for national security 
concems,20 i.e., controls focused on products with potential for mili-
tary or other strategic uses; and those adopted for foreign policy pur-
poses, 21 i.e., controls designed to punish (or deter) violations of human 
rights, support for terrorists, failure to control narcotics traffic, and 
similar objects of American anger. Foreign policy controls were to be 
shorter in duration unless explicitly renewed, and before imposing 
such controls, the President was to consult with Congress "in every 
possible instance."22 Moreover, before the President imposed export 
controls for reasons of foreign policy, he was supposed to consider -
not make a required finding, but to consider - six questions, framed 
in such a way as to make the President think twice before following his 
instinct to introduce a new control.23 The authority to impose na-
tional security controls was also accompanied by eight pages' worth of 
16. Equal Export Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-412, 86 Stat. 644 (1972). 
17. Export Administration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-500, 88 Stat. 1553 (1974). 
18. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977). 
19. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-2420 (West Supp. 1990)) [hereinafter Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979]. This Act, though further amended as discussed below, remains the operative 
legislation as of 1990. 
20. Export Administration Act of 1979, supra note 19, § 5 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 
(1982)). 
21. Export Administration Act of 1979, supra note 19, § 6 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 
(1982)). 
22. Export Administration Act of 1979, supra note 19, § 6(e) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2405(e) (1982)). The Act also provided for consultation with such affected industries as the 
Secretary of Commerce considers appropriate. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(c) (1982). 
23. Export Administration Act of 1979, supra note 19, §§ 6(b)(l)-(b)(6) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. §§ 2405(b)(l)-(b)(6) (1982)). For example: 
When imposing, expanding, or extending export controls ... the President shall consider -
(4) the likely effects of the proposed controls on the export performance of the United 
States, on the competitive position of the United States in the international economy, on the 
international reputation of the United States as a supplier of goods and technology, and on 
individual United States companies and their employees and communities, including the 
effects of the controls on existing contracts .... 
50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(b) (1982). 
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advice from Congress, but the provision that the President could do 
essentially what he chose was retained, again subject to a determina-
tion "that the absence of export controls under this section would 
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States."24 
Professor Carter criticizes President Carter (pp. 70-72) for, in ef-
fect, negating the distinction deliberately drawn by Congress between 
national security and foreign policy export controls when he pro-
claimed his grain embargo following the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan "in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United 
States."25 Though I have been critical of presidents who abuse their 
powers in this area,26 I must say that in this case I come out for the 
President. It seems to me that the effort to put national security in one 
pigeonhole and foreign policy in another is misguided, if not unconsti-
tutional. To be sure, when the President restrained exports of grain 
and sports equipment and soft drinks to the Soviet Union in 1980, he 
was not acting "to restrict the export of goods and technology which 
would make a significant contribution to the military potential of [the 
Soviet Union]."27 But a determination that there would be a threat to 
the security of the United States if the Soviet Union were not made to 
see the seriousness of the American reaction to the invasion of Af-
ghanistan seems to me to fall well within the discretion of the Presi-
dent. Not only would no court ever challenge such a determination by 
the President,28 it would seem to me wrong for Congress to try to do 
24. Export Administration Act of 1979, supra note 19, § 5(f)(l) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2404(f)(l) (1982)). 
25. Memorandum from the President for the Secretary of Commerce on Shipments of Agri· 
cultural Commodities to the Soviet Union, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 32-33 (Jan. 7, 1980), 
reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980). 
26. See, e.g., Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions: Hearings on R.R. 
1560 and R.R. 2382 Before the Subcomm. on Intl Econ. Policy and Trade of the House Comm. 
on Intl Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-20, 43-51 (1977) (statement of Andreas Lowenfeld). 
This was the hearing on the effort led by Rep. Bingham of New York to repeal the Trading with 
the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976)), or at 
least restrict its use to wartime. The outcome was enactment of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 
(1982)). 
27. See Export Administration Act of 1979, supra note 19, § 3(2)(A) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 2402(2)(A) (1982)) (providing the predicate for imposition of national security controls 
under§ 5(a)(l) of the Act (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(l) (1982))). 
28. Compare, for example, a decision by Judge Flannery denying relief to the French subsidi· 
ary of a U.S. company caught between conflicting government orders in connection with the 
pipeline sanctions of 1982: 
[T]his court is acutely aware that the Export Administration Act, and the regulations 
promulgated pursuant to that Act, were intended to give effect to important foreign policy 
objectives of the United States. The regulations were issued following the imposition of 
martial law in Poland. • . . An injunction barring enforcement of their regulations, or their 
application to plaintiffs, would deny to the President one means by which to influence the 
actions of the Soviet Union. 
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldridge, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 1982) (order denying injunctive 
relief). For a longer excerpt and the setting of this case in context, see A. LOWENFELD, supra 
note 1, at 296-300. 
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so.29 Indeed my perception - I do not have hard evidence in support 
- is that Congress understood this, and wrote the 1979 Act, as well as 
earlier export control, foreign aid, and other legislation in the foreign 
economic policy area with enough play in the joints so that Presidents 
would seem, but would not really be, reined in. 30 
The immediate technical advantage gained by President Carter by 
relying on both national security and foreign policy authority for the 
grain embargo was that a provision in the 1979 Act that subjected 
controls on agricultural exports to disapproval within a thirty-day pe-
riod by concurrent resolution of Congress31 applied only to foreign 
policy and apparently not to national security controls. 32 Congress 
wanted to be sure - or almost sure - that this did not happen again, 
and spent five years getting its point across. Though farmers who had 
been hurt by the 1980 embargo were quite generously compensated by 
the government, Congress wrote into law in 1981 that if there were 
another such embargo, farmers would be compensated at a high rate 
designed to discourage resort to such a measure, whether for national 
security or for foreign policy purposes.33 In 1982, Congress sought to 
prohibit embargoes on agricultural products sold to major customers 
altogether, but, in the familiar pattern, left it open to the President to 
impose such an embargo anyway, if he declared a national emer-
gency. 34 Finally, in 1985, Congress closed the door on agricultural 
embargoes a little more, though still not completely. It expressly ex-
cluded export controls on agricultural products under the national se-
curity section of the Export Administration Act;35 it also provided (in 
a kind of substitute for the now discarded concurrent resolution de-
29. For a contrary view by an occasional teaching colleague of Professor Carter and former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce, see Murphy & Downey, National Security, Foreign 
Policy and Individual Rights: The Quandary of United States Export Controls, 30 INTL. & COMP. 
L.Q. 791, 815 (1981). 
30. For a detailed discussion of this theme, see Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins 
in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1297-305 (1988). 
31. This was, of course, before that device was held unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919 (1983). 
32. Export Administration Act of 1979, supra note 19, § 7(g)(3) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 
2406(g)(3) (1982)). . 
33. Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98, § 1204 (Agricultural Embargo 
Protection), 95 Stat. 1276 (1981) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1736G) (1988)). The Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry wrote, "The Committee is hopeful that the 
provision adopted will not only provide compensation in the case of a future embargo which is 
not across the board but will act as a restraint on the imposition of such an embargo in the first 
place." S. REP. No. 126, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CooE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1965, 2091. 
34. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 238, 96 Stat. 2294, 2326 (1983) 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 612c-3 (1988)). 
35. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § IOSG), 99 Stat. 
120, 127-28 (1985) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(q) (Supp. 1985)) [hereinafter Export Ad-
ministration Amendments Act of 1985] (adding § S(q) to the Export Administration Act of 
1979, supra note 19). 
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vice36) that controls on agricultural exports under the foreign policy 
section could be imposed only for sixty days unless Congress within 
that time adopts a joint resolution of approval. 37 But if all exports to 
the country in question were embargoed, then agricultural products 
could be included in the embargo as well. 38 
Apart from the issue of agricultural exports, which of course in-
volved important domestic political concerns, Congress tried once 
again in 1985 to expand its role. The questions the President was to 
"consider" before imposing foreign policy controls were retained in 
the Act,39 but for newly imposed controls (as contrasted with exten-
sion of existing ones), the President was required to make express de-
terminations. For example, with respect to the question concerning 
the effect of proposed controls on the export performance of the 
United States, 40 the President was now required to determine that "the 
[adverse] effect of the proposed controls ... does not exceed the benefit 
to United States foreign policy objectives .... "41 Also, the provision 
for advance consultation, which had been required with respect to for-
eign policy controls "in every possible instance,"42 was changed in the 
1985 amendments to be mandatory in every case and to require a de-
tailed report. 43 And so on . . . . 
36. See supra note 31. 
37. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, supra note 35, § l lO(d) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2406(g) (Supp. 1985)) (enacting a revised § 7(g)(3) of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, supra note 19). ' 
38. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, supra note 35, § 110(d) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2406(g)(3)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1985)). 
39. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
40. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
41. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, supra note 35, § 108(b) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2405(b)(l)(D) (Supp. IV 1985)) (enacting a revised§ 6(b) of the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979, supra note 19). 
42. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
43. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, supra note 35, §§ 108(d)(1) and 108(e) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(f) (Supp. 1985)) (modifying Export Administration Act of 
1979, supra note 19, to enact § 6(f)). The conference report on the bill says on this point: 
The conferees believe that actual consultation with Congress has rarely been within the 
spirit of the law. It has been perfunctory at best. That is why the Congress finds it neces-
sary to strengthen this subsection. Under this amendment the President would be required 
to consult with the Congress prior to the imposition of foreign policy export controls. 
This should result in more meaningful consultation, which is in keeping with article I, 
section 8, of the Constitution which gives to the Congress the power to regulate interna-
tional commerce. Export control authority is only delegated by Congress to the President, 
as provided in the Act, and the Congress intends that the President consult with the Con-
gress in the conduct of that delegated authority. 
The conferees intend that this will result in greater deliberation given by the President to 
suggestions to. impose foreign policy controls and that once imposed, the prior consultation 
with Congress will result in wiser control policies enjoying greater Congressional support. 
The conferees recognize that, under the provision, the President can still approach the 
Congress shortly before he wishes to take action imposing foreign policy export controls. In 
fact, on some occasions conditions may require that consultation take place no sooner than 
shortly before the controls are imposed. 
This consultation provision can be satisfied by means of consultation with the Chairmen 
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Does all of this matter? Would these restraints, for example, have 
prevented a fiasco such as the extraterritorial extensions of President 
Reagan's pipeline sanctions in response to martial law in Poland, 
which had the effect ohurning an East-West issue into a West-West 
controversy?44 I doubt it. So, I think, does Professor Carter. If a 
report is required, some staff member writes it; if a determination is 
needed, the word-processor spews it out; if the statute needs to be in-
terpreted, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Com-
merce, and the Attorney General all have legal staffs ready to do so. 
And many of the criteria, notably the emphasis on alternate sources 
for controlled products (the "foreign availability" issue), do not mean 
much if the object of the controls is to send a message rather than to 
accomplish a genuine denial. 
I have no quarrel with Professor Carter as he tells this story, and in 
a number of places he guided me through statutory changes that I had 
not fully understood until I read his book. Carter is no doubt right 
that presidents have taken advantage of loose language and broad 
delegations to impose export controls where other measures were 
closed to them, and where Congress would probably not have ap-
proved had its approval been required. In this respect export control 
measures resemble military adventures undertaken by Presidents in 
the exercise of their own judgment but on questionable legal authority, 
and the amendments described above resemble the largely unsuccess-
ful efforts by Congress to check these adventures, notably by the War 
Powers Resolution.4s 
I am less convinced than Professor Carter that stricter legislation is 
the answer. Writing in 1988, Carter holds up the much tighter Com-
prehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 198646 as an example of how Con-
gress can get the upper hand on the President in this area. It is ironic 
that when Congress seeks to check the imposition of economic sanc-
tions by the President it generally fails, while, at least in this instance, 
when it seeks to require the President to impose sanctions and to elim-
inate the opportunity for Presidential discretion, it succeeds over his 
veto.47 
and Ranking Members of the committee of jurisdiction in the Senate and the committee of 
jurisdiction in the House. Such consultation should also extend to the Chairmen and Rank-
ing Members of the relevant subcommittee of these committees. 
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 180, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 108, 119. 
44. Carter treats this episode briefly. See pp. 83-85. For a more detailed account, see A. 
LoWENFELD, supra note 1, at 273-306. 
45. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1541-1548 (1982)) (passed over President Nixon's veto). 
46. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-
5116 (1988)) (passed over President Reagan's veto). 
47. Another instance of this pattern is the Jackson-Yanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 402, 88 Stat. 1978, 2056 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432 
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More important, where democratic theory meets practical politics, 
is it really desirable to tie the President's hands as tightly as the Anti-
Apartheid Act did, because on this issue Congress (with justification) 
did not trust President Reagan? I am far from an expert on South 
Africa, and I have no well-informed views as to the wisest course for 
the W estem democracies to follow in response to the liberalizing steps 
taken by the South African government in the early months of 1990. 
Nor do I know what the President of the United States thinks would 
be the wisest course. But unlike Prime Minister Thatcher of Great 
Britain, who concluded that partial relaxation of sanctions would be a 
wise response to President de Klerk's actions, 48 or President Mitter-
and of France, who did not think so, 49 our own President was not 
allowed to exercise his best judgment, because he has no discretion 
until the conditions for termination of sanctions set out by Congress 
three and a half years ago have been met. so 
In short, Professor Carter makes a good case that Congress, having 
given the President a very long leash four decades ago with respect to 
export controls, has been trying for at least two decades to pull the 
leash in, without a great deal of success. Whether tighter laws are the 
solution seems to me problematic. 
II. EXPANDING THE OPTIONS: IMPORT AND FINANCIAL 
CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 
Professor Carter divides the economic sanctions available to the 
U.S. government into five categories: (1) export controls; (2) controls 
on financial transactions; (3) import controls; (4) reduction or cancela-
tion of bilateral assistance; and (5) curbs on assistance furnished by 
multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (p. 2). He concludes that American influ-
(1988)), which effectively killed the trade agreement negotiated in 1972 between the United 
States and the Soviet Union by requiring the President to determine that the emigration practices 
of the Soviet Union met the criteria set by Congress. In fact, the Jackson-Yanik amendment did 
contain a waiver authority which has been used from time to time (with respect to other 
nonmarket countries), but the waiver could not be granted without assurances from the Soviet 
Union that it was not prepared to give. 
48. Britain, in Split With Europe, Eases Pretoria Ban, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1990, at A7, col. 
1. 
49. Id. According to reports from the conference of heads of state or government of the 
EEC, only the Portuguese Prime Minister agreed with Thatcher. How this divergence fits with 
the Decision of the Council of Ministers of the European Community which called for measures 
by all member states is beyond the scope of this review. See Council Decision of 27 October 
1986, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 305) 45 (1986) (Dec. 86/517/EEC concerning the suspension 
of new direct investment in the Republic of South Africa). 
50. Some discretion is granted to the President by § 311 of the Act, 22 U.S.C. § 5061 (1988), 
if he determines that condition (1) and that three of the four conditions numbered (2)-(5) have 
been met, and if he determines that the government of South Africa has "made substantial pro-
gress toward dismantling the system of apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy ••.. " 
Such a determination may be overturned, however, if Congress enacts within a 30-day period n 
joint resolution of disapproval. 
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ence in the multilateral organizations (except for the Inter-American 
Development Bank) is insufficient to make a difference (pp. 158-73), 
and that turning the foreign assistance faucet on and off is of limited 
usefulness, since the likely targets of U.S. annoyance may well not be 
receiving U.S. aid in the first place (pp. 32-62). That leaves three ma-
jor categories. Carter's plan for the future (all of the final chapter) is 
to make the President's authority over these three types of controls 
roughly equal in scope. This could be accomplished by reducing the 
President's authority over the first category (export controls) to the 
level of his authority over financial and import controls; or by increas-
ing the President's authority in regard to financial and import controls 
to the level of his authority to impose export controls; or, finally, it 
could be done by setting the President's power over all three categories 
at some new level in between. Carter even has a bar graph to illustrate 
~hese three options (p. 239), though what the bars measure is not clear. 
As one might guess, Carter prefers the third alternative: that is, in-
creasing authority of the President to control imports and financial 
transactions while curbing the President's authority over exports. 
Curbing the authority over exports turns out to be more of what 
we saw in the first part of this review, plus expanding the protection 
for existing contracts (I don't like the term "sanctity" in this context) 
and enlarging the sunset provisions of the Export Administration 
Act,51 so that any major denial program against a given country would 
expire within a specified number of months unless Congress author-
ized its continuation. Furthermore, Carter suggests reining in extra-
territorial application of export controls, not by abolishing the 
authorities that are contained in (or have been read into) the statute, 
but by requiring the President to make stated findings before applying 
export controls beyond the nation's frontiers, including an evaluation 
of the interests of the United States and of any other states that might 
be affected (p. 253). I am pleased that Professor Carter would have 
presidents follow the techniques suggested by section 403 of the Re-
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 52 
Whether one can achieve this by legislation, I am not sure. I would be 
worried if recital of section 403 were to become another routine to be 
followed by drafters of proclamations and notices in the Federal 
Register. 
The second leg of Professor Carter's reform proposals, and the one 
closest to his heart, is to enlarge the President's authority to control 
51. Compare the 60-day rule with respect to agricultural export controls, mentioned supra in 
note 37 and accompanying text. 
52. R.E.sTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIFIED STATES 
§ 403 (1986). As most readers of this review will know, the Restatement sets out a series of 
criteria by which to evaluate any governmental action - legislative, executive, or judicial - that 
affects activity with links to more than one state, and concludes that an exercise of jurisdiction 
that is unreasonable in light of the criteria is unlawful. 
1942 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1930 
imports for political ends (pp. 254-60). He rejects using the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act53 (the successor to the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act), for this purpose, on the ground that 
emergency powers should be limited to genuine emergencies. I agree. 
He also rejects - wisely, I believe - using section 232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962,54 a national security provision originating in 
the Eisenhower administration and used only to limit the import of 
oil.55 Carter proposes a new statute (p. 255), modeled on the 1985 
amendments to the Export Administration Act. The statute would 
contain a detailed list of criteria for imposition of import controls, and 
would require prior consultation with Congress and with affected in-
dustries, consumer groups, and other countries (p. 255). Further, the 
statute would include a requirement for full reports to the Congress, a 
provision to protect existing contracts, and a provision for termination 
of a sanction unless Congress gave its affirmative approval within a 
specified period, say, six months from its initial imposition (p. 255). 
Subject to these restraints, the President could prohibit or limit as to 
amount the importation of any or all products from any country to 
further the foreign policy goals of the United States. 
Carter realizes that his proposal has some risks. He suspects that 
the American steel industry, for example, might suddenly become very 
concerned about human rights abuses in Taiwan or South Korea (p. 
256). I recall a few years ago that American pistachio growers became 
the chief lobbyists in Washington against trade with Iran. Carter 
thinks the dangers of political controls for protectionist ends might be 
minimized by requiring what he calls "linkage;" i.e., the prohibition 
on imports must be combined with other prohibitions - on aid or 
exports or investments - and the prohibition may not be focused on 
one product only, such as steel or rubber-soled footwear (pp. 257-59). 
While I appreciate Carter's concern for symmetry, and while he is 
clearly right that export controls have often been used because other 
options were not easily available, I am reluctant to embrace this pro-
posal. I believe our export control program has been tolerable because 
it always has been based on the proposition that it would be invoked 
only when an international situation or threat was so serious as to 
overcome mere commercial concerns. If commercial (i.e., protection-
ist) concerns were to run parallel with the tendency of government to 
"do something," I am afraid that sanctions - along with findings, 
determinations, consultations, and reports - would proliferate. The 
53. See supra note 26. 
54. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1862 (West Supp. 1990) (as amended). 
55. For a description of the Oil Import Program as it was administered from 1958 to 1973 -
a model that no rational government would wish to emulate - see Dam, Implementation of 
Import Quotas: The Case of Oil, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1971). 
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sanctions themselves would lose their force, and the position of the 
United States as the world's greatest market would begin to erode. 
I had not known that a proposal similar to Professor Carter's made 
it through the Senate in 1984.56 But even that bill, as approved by the 
Senate, would have contained a proviso that import sanctions could be 
imposed only if the President "determines and reports to the Congress 
... that such controls are consistent with the international obligations 
of the United States, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade."57 Carter acknowledges that GATT58 presents a serious prob-
lem for his proposal, but he argues that the problem is not insur-
mountable (pp. 259-60). Except where the country to be sanctioned is 
not a member of GATT (such as the U.S.S.R., Libya, Iran, and Iraq, 
to name a few possible targets), I do not see how a proposed import 
control - presumably a quantitative restriction or embargo that vio-
lates at least the Most Favored Nation Treatment required by article I 
and the prohibition on quotas contained in article XI - could be rec-
onciled with GATT. It might be possible to build on the Security Ex-
ceptions article (article XXI), but that boon to unilateral 
decisionmaking has never been attractive, and it seems doubtful that 
the United States would prevail in the GATT Council in the 1990s as 
it did at the height of the cold war when it announced that it would 
not grant Most Favored Nation treatment to products of Czechoslova-
kia. 59 As Carter himself points out (p. 136), when the United States 
imposed an embargo on trade with Nicaragua in 198560 (acting under 
emergency legislation 61), a GATT panel was unhappy and frustrated 
with the action of the United States in relying on article XXI. 62 
Carter suggests that the statute to carry out his plan should en-
courage, but not require, adherence to GATT. That way, he writes, "if 
the President thinks the foreign policy issue is compelling, he should 
have the discretion to take steps that might violate the General Agree-
ment, with the understanding that the other country could pursue its 
claims in GATT and obtain the allowed relief" (p. 259). If that 
56. S. 979, 98th Cong., lst & 2d Sess., 129 CoNG. REc. 7648-51 (1984). This bill was passed 
by the Senate in revised form. See 130 CoNG. REc. 4141 (1984). 
57. S. 979, 98th Cong., lst & 2d Sess. § 6(1), 130 CONG. REc. 4141, 4144 (1984). It was not 
adopted in the House of Representatives and the whole act was not passed until 1985 -without 
the provision in question. 
58. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948). 
59. See II GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 28 (June 8, 1949); id. 
at 36 (Sept. 27, 1951). 
60. See Exec. Order No. 12,513, 3 C.F.R. 342 (1986). 
61. See supra note 5. 
62. The report of the panel was not adopted and so is not a formal decision. For a detailed 
account, see Note, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT Dispute Settlement 
Panel and the Article XX/ Defense in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LA w & 
POLY. INTL. Bus. 603 (1987). 
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sounds cynical, I don't think such a charge fits Professor Carter. He 
does worry about what such a policy might do to the always fragile 
GATI, and suggests that his plan might be accompanied by other ef-
forts to strengthen GATI in the international trading system gener-
ally (pp. 259-60). The more I think about the proposal, however, the 
less I like it. Symmetry is nice, and Carter's point about the distorted 
set of options available to a President looking for a sanction to impose 
is valid. I am afraid, however, that Carter's proposal would simply 
put more arrows in the quiver of an executive branch that is already 
insufficiently devoted to the international trading system, without 
straightening out the arrows it presently possesses. 
For the third leg of his plan, Carter proposes to give the President 
increased authority over financial transactions, short of emergency 
controls (p. 260). He would permit controls over trade financing, such 
as dealing in letters of credit and acceptances tied to imports and ex-
ports, even where (if I understand him correctly) the imports or ex-
ports were not themselves prohibited. Further, he would permit 
restrictions on loans by U.S. banks to proscribed countries or entities, 
such as was done recently with respect to South Africa, 63 and he 
would perhaps also authorize the freezing of deposits by target coun-
tries or entities in U.S.-owned banks.64 
Of course, as Carter recognizes, money is fungible and U.S. banks 
no longer have a monopoly on transnational credit. Still, being on a 
credit blacklist maintained by the U.S. government might well be disa-
greeable enough to encourage some countries to mend their ways to 
escape the blacklist, or perhaps to decide not to do something bad (for 
instance, using chemical weapons) to avoid being put on the list in the 
first place. 
Again, Carter has a point. Again, however, I would be reluctant to 
give the U.S. government more means to cause trouble. As we have 
seen in connection with retaliation against Iran and Libya undertaken 
under emergency powers, financial controls can indeed cause trouble, 
not only for the target country but also for the global banking system 
and for commercial relations among friendly nations. 65 It is true that 
as the issuer of the world's principal transaction currency, the United 
States has greater opportunity to inflict pain on target nations than 
does any other country. But dollar dominance is not assured for all 
time - who, for example, remembers the pound sterling? In a period 
63. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 § 305, 22 U.S.C. § 5055 (1988). 
64. Pp. 265-67. Here, too, Carter cites bills introduced in Congress to provide the President 
with authority along the lines he suggests, first with respect to controlled (le., communist) coun-
tries, and later with respect to other countries, such as those that harbor or support terrorists. P. 
263 n.94. 
65. For a brief account of the U.S. freezing actions focusing on the ensuing litigation, see 
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733, 746-61 (1989). 
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when U.S. trade and budget deficits are financed so heavily by foreign-
ers who have confidence in the dollar, tinkering even a little bit with 
financial instruments denominated in dollars or issued by United 
States persons would, in my view, be taking a very large risk for rela-
tively little benefit. 
* * * 
~ do not want to end this review on a negative note. Carter's book 
is well informed, well written, and thorough, and his review of the 
existing jumble of U.S. authorities for economic sanctions makes a sig-
nificant point. Carter has had the courage to make suggestions where 
others, including this reviewer, have only asked questions and offered 
criticism. For anyone interested in the legal framework for U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions, International Economic Sanctions is an excellent 
source, both of information and of ideas. If Carter's cure is not to my 
liking, I nevertheless respect both his undertaking and his diagnosis. 
